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Abstract
Masquerade detection undertakes to determine
whether or not one computer user has impersonated
another, typically by detecting significant anomalies in
the victim’s normal behavior, as represented by a user
profile formed from system audit data, command histo-
ries, and other information characteristic of individ-
ual users. Among the many intrusion/masquerade-
detection algorithms in use today is the naive Bayes
classifier, which has been observed to perform imper-
fectly from time to time, as will any detector. This
paper investigates the prospect of a naive Bayes flaw
that foils the detection of attacks conducted by so-
called “super-masqueraders” whose incursions are con-
sistently undetected across an entire range of victims.
It is shown, through a rigorous mathematical exposition
and an empirical analysis involving over 13,000 experi-
ments, that the detector harbors a weakness (that could
be exploited by an attacker) causing it to err under cer-
tain conditions. The paper explores and describes those
conditions, and suggests how they can be overcome by
fortifying the algorithm with a diverse detection capa-
bility.
1 Introduction
Colloquially, the masquerade problem can be de-
scribed with the following scenario [8]. A legitimate
user takes a coffee break, leaving his/her terminal open
and logged in. During the user’s brief absence, an in-
terloper assumes control of the keyboard, and enters
commands, taking advantage of the legitimate user’s
privileges and access to programs and data. The inter-
loper’s commands may comprise read or write access to
private data, acquisition of system privileges, installa-
tion of malicious software, etc. Because the interloper
is impersonating a legitimate user, s/he is commonly
known as a masquerader. The term may also be ex-
tended to encompass the case of abuse of legitimate
privileges, that is, the case in which a user “masquer-
ades” as him/herself; e.g., an insider.
The assumption underlying the common approach
to detection of such illegitimate activity is that the
masquerader’s behavior (including the illegitimate be-
havior of a legitimate user) will deviate from the his-
torical behavior of the legitimate user. Profiles of nor-
mal user activity can be constructed from monitored
system-log, accounting-log or other log data containing
information such as time of login, physical location of
login, duration of user session, cumulative CPU time,
particular programs and commands executed, names of
files accessed, and so forth [5]. Illegitimate activity will
appear anomalous with respect to the user profile and,
when detected, will indicate likely masquerade activity.
It is natural to assume that no masquerade detector
will be perfect; some masquerade attacks will go unde-
tected, and some alarms will be raised even when there
is no masquerader present. Moreover, it would not be
unexpected to observe that a particular masquerader
is successful at penetrating some victims without be-
ing detected, and unsuccessful at penetrating others.
It would be surprising, however, to discover that some
masqueraders are able to escape detection no matter
who their victim is – and it is exactly this peculiarity
that was discovered in earlier work by Maxion, a phe-
nomenon here termed the “super-masquerader,” [6].1
Maxion [6, page 12] suggested that this super-
masquerader phenomenon might be due to the use of
commands that had never before been seen in the data
(for profiles of normal behavior), but the issue was not
pursued. The present work takes Maxion’s suggestion
as a point of departure, and explores the reason behind
the super-masquerader phenomenon.
2 Background and related work
There have been several attempts to tackle the prob-
lem of detecting masqueraders. A nice collection of
such work, in which a number of masquerade-detection
techniques were applied to the same data set, is sum-
marized by Schonlau and his colleagues in [11]. They
1In [6], Table 6, columns 7 and 24 show no + or * symbols
indicating a detection; all penetrations went undetected.
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compared the performance of six masquerade-detection
algorithms (some new, others drawn from the computer
science literature), seeking to target a false alarm rate
of 1%. All methods had relatively low hit rates (39.4%
- 69.3%) and high false alarm rates (1.4% - 6.7%).
The results were compared using both cluster analy-
sis and ROC curves, revealing that no single method
completely dominated any other.
In terms of minimizing false alarms, the best re-
sult achieved in the Schonlau et al. work used a metric
based on the uniqueness of commands to a user, obtain-
ing a 39.4% hit rate with a corresponding 1.4% false
alarm rate. In terms of detecting masqueraders, the
best results reported in the Schonlau et al. work were
for a Bayes one-step Markov model, with a 69.3% hit
rate and a 6.7% false alarm rate.
Maxion and Townsend [7], reasoning that masquer-
ade detection bore similarities to text classification, ex-
perimented with a new detector based on naive Bayes
applied to the same data used by Schonlau et al. Naive
Bayes had performed well in text classification tasks
[9], and it was expected that it would perform well as
a masquerade detector, too. Their intuition was borne
out, as they achieved a 61.5% hit rate with a corre-
sponding 1.3% false alarm rate, for an improvement
of 55.78% over Schonlau’s best detector (uniqueness)
when the cost of misses and false alarms are equal.
Maxion and Townsend later conducted an extensive
study of masquerade detection accompanied with error
analysis, providing insight into the causes of masquer-
ader success and failure [8].
All of the above work used data in the form of trun-
cated command lines, meaning that the data comprised
user-level commands issued at the Unix command line,
but with no command-line arguments, flags or gram-
mar. Maxion [6], in a new approach, used the naive
Bayes detector on a data set of enriched command
lines (to include arguments, flags, etc.), anticipating
improvements due to the extra information on the com-
mand lines. A hit rate of 82.1% was achieved, accom-
panied by a false alarm rate of 5.7%, concomitantly re-
ducing the cost of error by 30.02%. It was in this study
that the super-masquerader phenomenon was discov-
ered.
Observation of a phenomenon like the super-
masquerader leads one to wonder if there is some unan-
ticipated interaction between the detection algorithm
and the characteristics of the data on which it oper-
ates. Although other researchers seem not to have ob-
served the super-masquerader, they have investigated
some aspects of the relationship between data char-
acteristics and naive Bayes performance. Domingos
and Pazzani [2], for example, examined the degree to
which features in the data are independent, and how
violations of naive Bayes’ “independence assumption”
affect performance. They showed that in many cases
where this assumption is violated, naive Bayes can still
perform well as a classifier. The probability estima-
tions on test data may be incorrect, but they still lead
to the correct choice of class. Rish et al. [10] studied
the performance of naive Bayes when the independence
assumption is grossly violated, e.g., when all other fea-
tures are one-to-one functions of a particular feature.
They found that naive Bayes performs very well under
such conditions, and determined that the entropy of
the probability distribution of a feature (conditioned
on the class of the data point) is a better measure of
naive Bayes performance than measures of the indepen-
dence of features (e.g., mutual information). Bressan
and Vitria` [1] proposed a means of preprocessing data
using a class-conditional independent component ana-
lyzer to transform the features so as to minimize the
dependencies between the transformed features. They
showed an improvement in the performance of naive
Bayes when these transformed features were used.
3 Objective and approach
The objective of the present research is to under-
stand the phenomenon of the super-masquerader and
to determine whether or not there are measures avail-
able to counteract it.
Starting from the aforementioned observation that
super-masqueraders may be facilitated by the pres-
ence of “never-before-seen-commands” (NBSCs) in the
data, it is hypothesized that NBSCs tend to lower the
naive Bayes anomaly score such that it drops below the
threshold anomaly score. Such a low anomaly score
causes decisions (inappropriately) to favor the victim
instead of the masquerader, with the consequence that
the detector cannot detect the attack, hence a missed
detection.
The hypothesis will be explored in two stages. First,
the mathematical underpinnings of the naive Bayes al-
gorithm will be explored to determine whether or not
there is a theoretical justification for the observed ef-
fect of NBSCs. Second, an empirical investigation will
measure the effects of NBSCs, carefully controlling for
confounding factors in the environment. With these
effects confirmed, a strategy for fortifying naive Bayes
against the adverse effects will be considered.
4 Naive Bayes mathematical model
Why might never-before-seen commands (NBSCs)
cause naive Bayes to consider a masquerader to be less
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suspicious? In this section, a mathematical model of
naive Bayes is created to help answer this question.
The general theory of naive Bayes is reviewed. Then,
the naive Bayes decision procedure is modeled as a
mathematical equation. By isolating the effect of NB-
SCs on that procedure, the anomaly score can be seen
to tend toward self as NBSCs are inserted. Under-
standing the calculation of the naive Bayes anomaly
score is key to understanding the decision procedure.
By examining this calculation, the parameters that af-
fect the anomaly score can be identified and predictions
can be made as to their effect.
4.1 Overview of naive Bayes
Naive Bayes classifiers are simple, probabilistic clas-
sifiers known for their inherent robustness to noise and
their fast learning time (learning time is linear in the
number of examples). They were first applied to user
profiling, with command-line data, for masquerade de-
tection by Maxion and Townsend [7]. In this context
of user profiling, the classifier works as follows. A set
of “self training data” consisting of a sequence of com-
mands (usually 1000 or more) generated by the target
user is used to build a model of self. A set of “non-
self training data” consisting of sequences of commands
generated by other legitimate system users is used to
build a model of nonself. These models allow naive
Bayes to estimate the probability that a new “test”
block of commands was generated either by the target
user (in the case of the self model) or by some other
user (in the case of the nonself model).
The models assume that the user generates a se-
quence of commands, one command at a time, each
with a fixed probability that is independent of the com-
mands preceding it (this independence assumption is
the “naive” part of Naive Bayes). As such, the proba-
bility that a command c was generated by the self user
is estimated as follows.
P (c | S) = s[c] + p
st + αp
(1)
c: a command (e.g., c =‘ls’)
S: the self model
s[c]: the number of times c is in the self training data
st: the total size of the self training data
p: naive Bayes pseudocount
α: alphabet size
The parameter p is a pseudocount and α is the num-
ber of distinct commands (i.e., the alphabet) in the
data. The pseudocount can be any real number larger
than zero (0.01 in this study as in earlier ones [7, 6]),
and is added to ensure that there are no zero counts;
the lower the pseudocount, the more sensitive the de-
tector is to previously unseen commands. The pseu-
docount term in the denominator compensates for the
addition of a pseudocount in the numerator.
The probability P (c | N) that a command c was gen-
erated by a nonself user is estimated likewise (only with
n[c], the number of times c is in the nonself training
data, replacing s[c], and nt, the number of commands
in the nonself training data, replacing st).
To calculate the probability that a block b of
commands was generated by the self user (where
c1, c2, . . . , cb denote the commands), naive Bayes uses
two simplifying assumptions. The first is the inde-
pendence assumption just described. The conditional
probability of each command is considered independent
of the probabilities of the other commands in the block.
The second assumption is that a sequence of commands
in a block is just a “bag of words” in that the order of
the commands does not matter, only their frequency.
Because of these assumptions, the probability that a
block of commands was generated by the self user is
simply the product of the probabilities that each indi-
vidual command in the block was generated by the self
user, and likewise for the probability the block was gen-
erated by a nonself user. For ease of computation, the
logarithm of these products is calculated rather than
the products themselves.
When naive Bayes tests a block of commands, look-
ing for masquerader activity, it computes an anomaly
score for each block. The anomaly score is calculated
as the ratio of the self log-probability to the nonself
log-probability as shown in Equation 2. If the anomaly
score is greater than a threshold, naive Bayes decides
that a masquerader is present and classifies the block
as “nonself.” If the anomaly score does not exceed the
threshold, naive Bayes decides the activity is normal
and classifies the block as “self.”
score =
b∑
i=1
log
s[ci] + p
st + αp
b∑
i=1
log
n[ci] + p
nt + αp
(2)
b: number of commands in the test block
ci: a particular command in the test block
s[ci]: number of cis in self training data
n[ci]: number of cis in nonself training data
st: total size of self training data
nt: total size of nonself training data
p: naive Bayes pseudocount
α: alphabet size
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The exact cut-off between a classification of self
and nonself, that is the ratio of log-probabilities above
which the likelihood that the sequence was generated
by self is deemed too low, can be configured by hand
or automatically determined using the self and nonself
training data in a cross-validation experiment [7].
4.2 Manipulating the anomaly score
As mentioned above, the anomaly score calculation
is critical to understanding the naive Bayes’ decision
procedure. To better understand the effect of NBSCs,
Equation 2 can be algebraically manipulated to make
the influence of NBSCs clear. The equation will be
rewritten to express the number of NBSCs and other
characteristics of the data as parameters in the decision
procedure, and basic algebraic properties will be used
to isolate the influence of these characteristics.
In Equation 2, since both (st+αp) and (nt+αp) are
constant with respect to the summations, they can be
factored out. Further, since naive Bayes trains on equal
amounts of data for each user, the amount of nonself
training data (denoted nt in Equation 2) is simply the
amount of self training data multiplied by the number
of nonself users (i.e., those whose training data went
into making the nonself training data). The number of
nonself users is denoted m. Note the equality nt = mst.
Next, if the simplifying assumption is made that all
of the nonself users are equal (i.e., that a command c
has the same relative frequency in all m of the non-
self users’ training data), and n′[c] is taken to be the
number of times c appears in any one nonself user’s
training data, then the total number of times c ap-
pears in the nonself training data is simply the number
of times c appears in any one nonself user’s training
data multiplied by the number of nonself users (i.e.,
n[c] = mn′[c]). Since naive Bayes combines the data of
all the nonself users, nothing is changed by assuming
that command frequencies do not change between these
users. By substituting mst for nt and mn′[t] for n[t] in
Equation 2 and factoring out the denominators within
each of the summations, the effect of the number of
nonself users (m) can be separated from the summa-
tion.
Finally, the role NBSCs play in the calculation of
the anomaly score can be considered. Let us assume,
without loss of generality, that any NBSCs in the mas-
querader block occur in the first k commands. I.e.,
c1, . . . , ck are NBSCs while ck+1, . . . , cb have been seen-
before in the training data. Since naive Bayes ignores
the ordering of the commands, they can be rearranged
with no effect on the anomaly score, hence the general-
ity of these results is maintained. If ci is a NBSC (i.e.,
i ≤ k), then ci has never been seen in the training data.
More formally, s[ci] = n′[ci] = 0. As such, the effect of
these commands can be split out from the rest of the
summation in both the numerator and the denomina-
tor. Figure 1 shows the final expression of the anomaly
score calculation in which the effect of the number of
NBSCs has been isolated.
score =
red︷ ︸︸ ︷
k · log(p)−
blue︷ ︸︸ ︷
b · log(st − αp) +
black︷ ︸︸ ︷
b∑
i=k+1
log(s[ci] + p)
k · log(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
red
− b · log(mst − αp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
blue
+
b∑
i=k+1
log(mn′[ci] + p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
black
b : the number of commands in the test block
k : number of NBSCs in the test block
ci : a particular command in the test block
s[ci] : number of cis in self training data
n′[ci]: number of cis in a nonself user’s training data
st : total size of self training data
m : the number of nonself training users
p : naive Bayes pseudocount
α : alphabet size
Figure 1. Calculation of anomaly score for
naive Bayes detector, depicted in colored re-
gions. Red: influence of never-before-seen
commands (NBSCs). Blue: influence of the
size of the training data. Black: influence of
the similarity of the test block to each of the
self and nonself training data sets.
4.3 Interpreting the anomaly score
Before further analyzing the equation in Figure 1, it
would be useful to review how the anomaly score should
be interpreted. The anomaly score is a ratio, and it
compares the probability that a block of commands
came from the self model to the probability that the
same block came from the nonself model. These are
conditional probabilities, i.e., P (c1, . . . , cb | S) is the
probability of the block of commands given the self
model. Likewise, P (c1, . . . , cb | N) is the probability of
those commands given the nonself model.
In a Bayesian framework, the most likely model for
the data (i.e., self or nonself) is found by multiply-
ing the probability of the data, given the model (e.g.,
P (c1, . . . , cb | S)), by the prior probability of the model
(e.g., P (S)). The product of these two probabilities
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for the self model is proportional to the probability of
the self model having generated the data (using Bayes’
theorem). Likewise, the probability that the nonself
model generated the data is in the same proportion
to the nonself conditional and prior probabilities (i.e.,
P (c1, . . . , cb | N) · P (N)).
Normally these two probabilities could be compared
and the data would be attributed to the maximum
probability model (i.e., self or nonself). However,
in masquerade detection, the prior probabilities (i.e.,
P (S) and P (N)) are unknown, and they cannot be
estimated from the training data. As such, a thresh-
old is estimated from the training data, and the ra-
tio of the logarithms of the two probabilities (i.e.,
P (c1, . . . , cb | S) and P (c1, . . . , cb | N)) is compared
to this threshold. The threshold, then, can be thought
of as a choice of priors. For example, if a threshold
of 1 were chosen, that would be equivalent to assum-
ing that the prior probabilities of self and nonself were
equal (i.e., P (S) = P (N) = 1). Given these equal pri-
ors, an anomaly score greater than one indicates that
the block of commands is more likely to come from the
nonself model. In general higher anomaly scores indi-
cate a higher probability that the block of commands
was generated by the nonself model. Lower scores indi-
cate a higher probability that the block was generated
by the self model.
4.4 Predicted effect of NBSCs
Figure 1 shows that the numerator and denomina-
tor of the anomaly score calculation can be effectively
divided into three parts. The first part, highlighted
in red, indicate the influence of the number of NBSCs
(k). Since the pseudocount (p) is a constant, and in
this study it is assumed to be between zero and one
(0 < p < 1), in both the numerator and the denomina-
tor, the red part is a constant negative number relative
to the number of NBSCs.
The second part, highlighted in blue, indicates the
influence of the size of the training data (st) and the
number of nonself users (m). Since the number of non-
self users is a positive integer (m ≥ 1) and the amount
of self training data is assumed to be greater than the
size of the alphabet times the pseudocount and hence
(st − αp > 1), the blue part of the numerator is going
to be a positive number no greater than the blue part
of the denominator (because m ≥ 1). Since these posi-
tive numbers are being subtracted from equal negative
numbers (i.e., the red part), the effect of this second
part is to make the numerator a negative number no
less than the negative number in the denominator.
k · log(p)− b · (mst − αp) < k · log(p)− b · (st − αp) < 0
The third part, in black, indicates the remaining
influence of commands which do appear in the training
data. As the number of NBSCs increase, the influence
of this part decreases. In the limit, when the block
consists of NBSCs and nothing else (k = b), this sum
will be zero, and left in the numerator will be a negative
number no less than the denominator. In this limit,
the anomaly score will be a positive number (from the
division of two negative numbers) and it will be no
greater than 1 (with equality when m = 1 and it will
be strictly less than 1 if m > 1).
There is an underlying bias toward a lower anomaly
score if the number of nonself users is greater than one.
This bias only gets larger as the number of nonself
users increases. When the number of NBSCs is large,
this bias comes to the surface, resulting in an anomaly
score that is one or less. If the anomaly score is less
than one, then equivalently, the probability that the
test block was generated by the self user is more likely
than the probability that the block was generated by
the nonself user (assuming equal priors). This analysis
suggests that NBSCs do increase the likelihood that a
masquerade block will be classified as self, resulting in
a missed masquerader incident.
4.5 Visualizing the effect of NBSCs
To support the correctness of the analysis, the
anomaly score in Figure 1 is plotted as a function of
the number of NBSCs (k). The number of commands
in the self training data (st) is set to 1000, and the
number of nonself users (m) to 10. The pseudocount
(p) is set to 0.01, and the alphabet size (α) to 122.
The assumption is made that, in addition to the NB-
SCs, only one other command appears in the test block
and that it was repeated as many times as necessary to
fill the block. The number of appearances of the com-
mand in the self data set (s[ci]) is set to 0. The number
of appearances in the nonself data of a particular user
(n′[ci]) is 10. As such, this command is expected to be
much more likely to come from the nonself model. The
number of NBSCs in the block ranges from 0 to 10.
Figure 2 shows that, without any NBSCs, the
anomaly score for this block is predictably high. As
the number of NBSCs increases, the anomaly score
drops, indicating that the difference between the self
and nonself probabilities is decreasing. The first few
NBSCs have the greatest effect on the anomaly score.
The score continues to drop as the number of NBSCs
increases, passing below 1 when the number of NBSCs
is 7, and continuing to drop as the number of NBSCs
increases to 10.
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Number of never-before-seen commands
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Figure 2. Prediction of mathematical model:
as the number of NBSCs increases, the pre-
dicted anomaly score decreases. Horizontal
line separates regions in which the probabil-
ity of nonself (above) is greater than the prob-
ability of self (below), assuming equal prior
probabilities of each.
The horizontal line indicates what the anomaly score
threshold would be if self and nonself had equal prior
probabilities. In general this assumption will not hold,
as the threshold will be computed through cross val-
idation, but it helps to illustrate that the anomaly
score passes below a threshold as the number of NBSCs
increases. This graphical demonstration is consistent
with the analytical procedure, and confirms that the
general effect of NBSCs is to lower the anomaly score
by increasing the self probability with respect to the
nonself probability.
4.6 Implications of the analysis
In this section, two key observations have been made
about the equation in Figure 1. First, as the number of
NBSCs in the masquerader block increases, the NBSC
anomaly score tends toward a particular point. The
point was found to be no greater than 1, and inde-
pendent of the other parameters of the data except for
the number of nonself users in the training data (m).
Second, for a particular selection of parameters in the
equation, the effect of an increase in NBSCs was found
to decrease the anomaly score. From this second obser-
vation arose the following questions. Do NBSCs always
decrease the anomaly score? Is it possible for some
selections of parameters to cause NBSCs to increase?
Nothing in the analysis thus far prevents the anomaly
score from increasing as a result of NBSCs. However,
any increase is bounded so that it does not exceed 1.
Unless the threshold is lower than 1, such an increase
will have no effect. The hypothesis remains that, in
general, NBSCs tend to lower the anomaly score such
that it drops below the threshold.
5 Experimental method
A series of experiments was run to validate the
mathematical model. As a basis for assessing the valid-
ity of what was done, this section provides details of the
methods and data used in the experiments. The fol-
lowing are addressed: (1) selection of data parameters
that influence naive Bayes’ performance; (2) procedure
for running naive Bayes on the data; (3) generation and
format of the data sets; and (4) experiment control.
5.1 Parameter selection
Eight factors that influence the anomaly score of
naive Bayes can be identified from the equation in Fig-
ure 1. The effect of four of these factors, however, is
either minimal or unrelated to data set characteristics:
alphabet size (α) is a product of the environment, not
of a particular dataset; pseudocount (p) and block size
(b) are configuration parameters of the detector, not
of the data; and the number of commands in the self
training data (st) does not have an obvious effect on
the anomaly score beyond its relationship to m, the
number of nonself users in the training data. These
will not be further examined here, because they have
little or no influence on the anomaly score.
Four remaining factors stand out as parameters that
affect the anomaly score:
1. The number of nonself training users. (m)
2. The “self-ness” of the masquerade block, mean-
ing the number of times the seen-before command
appears in the self training data. (s[ci])
3. The “nonself-ness” of the masquerade block,
meaning the number of times the seen-before com-
mand appears in the training data of a particular
nonself user. (n′[ci])
4. The number of NBSCs in the masquerade block.
(k)
By running naive Bayes on controlled data, these
four factors – those exerting the most influence on the
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anomaly score – will be examined. The factors not
used were held constant over the experiments, and set
to the same value as used in [6] (except for the al-
phabet size, which was determined by the number of
commands needed to synthesize the data sets, as de-
scribed below). The alphabet size (α) is set to 122.
The pseudocount (p) is set to 0.01, and the block size
(b) is set to 10. The size of the self training data (st)
is set to 1000.
In the following sections, where the effects of NBSCs
are analyzed, these parameters will be used to guide
the evaluation process and the generation of synthetic
data.
5.2 Procedure
Naive Bayes operates by learning models of self
and nonself with (respectively) self and nonself train-
ing data, and by using those models to calculate an
anomaly score on test data (in this case, a block of
masquerade data) and using that score to discriminate
between self and nonself blocks of test data. Steps in
the procedure were as follows.
1. Train on self data. Train naive Bayes (NB) clas-
sifier on self data; establish a model for self.
2. Train on nonself data. Train NB on the nonself
data to establish a model for nonself. Since one of
the factors influencing the results of NB is the number
of nonself users, training on nonself could constitute
training on a single nonself user, or on multiple nonself
users. If NB trains on more than one nonself user, the
same nonself data set is used multiple times; a single
set of commands comprises a nonself user.
3. Compute the anomaly threshold. Compute the
anomaly threshold by 5-fold cross validation. Details
of how cross validation works can be found in [8].
4. Test unknown sample. Test on a masquer-
ade block. Note that the masquerade block could be
thought of as being embedded in self data; however,
in these experiments there is no need for such embed-
ding, because the models of self and nonself are not
being updated. For details on updating, see [8].
5. Decision. Decide whether the masquerade block
was correctly detected by comparing the anomaly score
with the threshold.
5.3 Synthetic data
There are three data types in the experiment: the
self training data (for building the model of nor-
mal behavior), the nonself training data (for building
the model of abnormal behavior), and the unknown-
behavior block (the potential masquerader). These
data are constructed as follows.
Self training data. The self data set comprises
1000 elements (commands) of one user’s data. Since
the experimental objective is to examine the effect of
commands that are novel (never seen before) to the
naive Bayes classifier, and these novel commands are
always outside the scope of the self data, there is no
need for the self data ever to change; therefore, this
data set is static; there is only one “self” in the ex-
periments. The length of 1000 was chosen because it
is consistent with previous work done in masquerade
detection (e.g., [7, 6]), as well as for its convenience as
a multiple of 10.
To achieve a range of variation in frequencies of self
commands and nonself commands across the self and
nonself training data sets, commands are drawn from
the 11x11 matrix shown in Table 1.2

Se
lf-
ne
ss

Nonself-ness
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
2 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
3 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
4 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
5 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 51 53 54 55
6 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
7 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
8 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
9 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
10 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
11 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121
Table 1. Matrix of commands, varying in both
“selfness” and “nonselfness”.
Note that a command is more likely to come from
self (or nonself) if its frequency in the respective data
set is higher. This observation makes it possible to
populate the self training data with commands that
vary in relative frequency (from .001 to .01), by tak-
ing commands with varying repetitions from each row
of the command matrix. 605 of the 1000 commands
in the self data are chosen from the cells of Table 1
(with replacement). Each of the 11 commands in row
2The commands shown here are numeric for convenience, but
are treated as being categorical in the detection experiments.
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1 of the table appear once in the data (11 commands);
each of the 11 in row 2 appear twice (22 commands);
each from row 3 appear three times (33 commands),
and so on up to the 11 commands in row 10 which ap-
pear 10 times (110 commands). The commands in row
11 do not appear in the self data. The commands from
rows 1 through 10 of Table 1 are 605 of the 1000 com-
mands in the data. The remaining commands comprise
395 repetitions of a 111th command (“122” is used, a
symbol which is outside the scope of the table), and
are used to pad out the data set to 1000 commands.
Although the naive Bayes algorithm is not influ-
enced by the order in which these commands are placed
in the data set, the commands were distributed as
evenly as possible across five blocks of 200. For exam-
ple, the first 11 commands would have two commands
in each of the five blocks (totaling 10) and the 11th ei-
ther remaining in the last block, or overflowing to the
first block. Of the second set of 11 commands, the first
two would appear twice each in the first block, and so
on through the 5th block, with similar treatment of
overflow. This method of distributing the commands
evenly throughout the 1000 commands ensured that
the results of the cross-validation step (in learning the
self model) would not be biased by a preponderance of
one group of commands in any of the five blocks of 200
commands.
Nonself training data. The nonself training data
set is constructed similarly, except that command-
matrix columns are used, not rows. Commands in col-
umn 1 appear once in the nonself training data, com-
mands in column 2 appear twice, and so forth, through
column 10, which is used ten times. Column 11 is not
used.
Unknown-behavior block. Populate the mas-
querader block (10 elements) with the appropriate pro-
portion of seen-before commands (SBCs) and never-
before-seen commands (NBSCs) as directed by the pa-
rameter vector (described in the next section). Repli-
cate the NBSC as many times as required by the pa-
rameter value, and pad out the remainder of the 10
elements with the chosen SBC (row and column of the
command matrix).3 Note that command “121” in row
11, column 11 appears in neither self nor nonself; it is
the NBSC.
5.4 Experiment control
The experiments were controlled by stepping
through the parameters in the form of a 4-element vec-
tor:
3If selfness is 0, use row 11; if nonselfness is 0, use column 11.
〈m, s[ci], n′[ci], k〉
The four components in the parameter vector corre-
spond to the aforementioned parameters of the self and
nonself training data and the test data. In this case,
since the focus is on the detection of masqueraders, the
test data consists of a single masquerader block.
The vector encodes particular values for each of the
four parameters. For example, the parameter vector
〈5, 3, 4, 6〉 corresponds to a situation in which there are
five users in the nonself training data (m = 5), the
seen-before command in the masquerade block appears
three times in the self training data (s[ci] = 3) and
four times in each of the nonself user’s training data
(n′[ci] = 4). Note that the particular command is “26”
as drawn from row 3 and column 4 of Table 1. The
masquerade block has six never-before-seen commands
(k = 6). The data set used in an experiment is created
using that experiment’s parameter vector.
The parameter vector’s starting state is 〈1, 0, 1, 0〉.
The first parameter, number of nonself users, starts at
1 because the number of nonself users must be greater
than zero. The third parameter, nonselfness, is 1 to
avoid the case in which selfness and nonselfness are
both zero. The other two parameters begin at zero.
Ten was chosen as an upper bound on the range of all
the parameters, so the parameter vector’s final state is
〈10, 10, 10, 10〉.
There are 10 possible values for the first parameter
and 11 for each of the other parameters. There are a
total of 10 × 11 × 11 × 11 = 13310 different combina-
tions. However, those combinations where the selfness
and nonselfness are both zero are excluded. When the
selfness and nonselfness are both zero, there are still
10 values for the first parameter and 11 values for the
fourth parameter. These 10 × 11 = 110 combinations
must be excluded. Each of the 13310 − 110 = 13200
distinct parameter vectors were used to generate 13200
data sets, on each of which an experiment was con-
ducted.
6 Results and analysis
In this section, the results of this experiment into
the effects of NBSCs on naive Bayes are presented and
discussed. Three related results are described. First,
the effect of NBSCs on the anomaly score in a particu-
lar case are used to confirm that the predictions made
by the mathematical model in Section 4 are correct.
Second, the aggregate effect of NBSCs is visualized by
comparing the number of NBSCs to the percentage of
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runs in which the masquerade block was correctly de-
tected. Third, the effect of NBSCs on the anomaly
score, under many different conditions, is presented at
once to show that the anomaly scores do indeed con-
verge to a single point, below the threshold, resulting
in missed detections.
6.1 Accuracy of model
In Section 4.5, Figure 2 shows the predicted anomaly
scores for the selected case of: (1) the number of non-
self users is 10; (2) the number of times the seen-before
command appeared in the self training data is 0; (3) the
number of times the seen-before command appeared
in the training data of a particular nonself user is 10;
and (4) the number of NBSCs ranges from 0 to 10.
When the anomaly scores generated by naive Bayes on
synthetic data with these same characteristics is com-
pared against the scores predicted by the mathematical
model, they match exactly. The graph of the empirical
results looks just like the predicted graph in Figure 2,
but for a slight difference in the threshold. The thresh-
old calculation was beyond the scope of the mathe-
matical model and so assumed to be 1. Empirically,
the threshold is computed through cross validation to
be 1.04.
The mathematical model accurately predicts the
anomaly score generated by naive Bayes. Given this
confirmation of correctness, the model can be used to
make predictions about naive Bayes’ performance un-
der various conditions.
6.2 NBSCs and hit rate
Figure 3 shows the effect that NBSCs have on the
hit rate. The number of NBSCs ranged between 0 and
10. The hit rate at each NBSC value was calculated
as the percentage of synthetic datasets with the spec-
ified number of NBSCs in which naive Bayes was able
to detect the masquerade block. (Note that 100% de-
tection is not expected here; for example, at least half
of the test cases driven by the 4-element control vec-
tor in Section 5.4 would not have had a selfness that
raised an anomaly in the first place.) With no NB-
SCs, 36.28% of the masquerade blocks are able to be
detected. With only a single NBSC in the masquerade
block, that percentage drops to 28.59%. As the num-
ber of NBSCs increases, the hit rate falls. When the
masquerade block consists of eight or more NBSCs, the
percentage of detected blocks drops to zero.4 This re-
sult supports the hypothesis that NBSCs tend to lower
4The values selected for each of the parameters in the data
generation process (e.g., self-ness and nonself-ness), were evenly
spaced in the range of values under consideration. The non-
the anomaly score, causing the naive Bayes decision
procedure to favor the self user, thereby resulting in
missed detections of masqueraders.
NBSC value
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Percentage of hits vs. NBSC
Figure 3. Percentage of synthetic datasets in
which masquerade block is detected. For 8
or more NBSCs, no detections occurred.
6.3 NBSCs and anomaly score
Figure 4 shows the variety of effects that NBSCs
have on different masquerade blocks. The graph shows
120 curves corresponding to all the cases where the
number of nonself users in the training data (m) is
10. The figure is restricted to these cases to illustrate
that, when the number of nonself users is fixed, the
anomaly scores all converge to a point. Each curve
corresponds to a particular “selfness” (s[ci]) and “non-
selfness” (n′[ci]) count. Each curve plots the change in
the anomaly score as the number of NBSCs (k) ranges
from 0 to 10, leaving all other parameters fixed. Two
observations can be made about this figure. First, the
anomaly scores converge to a point. Second, under cer-
tain conditions, the effect of the NBSCs is to increase
the anomaly score.
linear nature of the anomaly score function causes the resulting
anomaly scores to be unevenly spaced along the curve in the
graph; the scores fall in clumps. The flat spot, where the hit rate
is unchanged between NBSC counts of 5 and 6, is an artifact of
the range of values that was considered, as well as the choice of
values within that range. Had this range been extended, or had
the values been chosen differently, the flat spot would disappear.
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Convergence to a point. Masquerade blocks are
10 commands long. When a masquerade block contains
10 NBSCs, it is filled completely with NBSCs. Since
all NBSCs have the same probability, there is one score
that naive Bayes assigns to a block filled with NBSCs.
Different seen-before commands have varying charac-
teristics of self-ness and nonself-ness, so masquerade
blocks with different seen-before commands have dif-
ferent anomaly scores. Consider two different masquer-
ade blocks. As the different seen-before commands are
replaced with NBSCs, the difference in the anomaly
scores of the two blocks decreases. When all the seen-
before commands are replaced with NBSCs, the two
blocks are indistinguishable, and any difference in their
anomaly scores disappears. The anomaly scores of the
two blocks have converged to the same point.
Some scores rise. It is interesting to note that
in 25 cases the anomaly score actually increases from
its starting point (when a block contains no NBSCs).
Without NBSCs, these blocks have a very high self
probability and a very low nonself probability. The
seen-before command in these blocks appears many
more times in the self data than the nonself. How-
ever, as those seen-before commands are replaced with
NBSCs, for which the difference in the self and non-
self probabilities is not as high, the anomaly score of
the block actually increases. This effect is not surpris-
ing, as it indicates that a masquerader who is already
able to mimic self-behavior well would not increase the
chance of remaining undetected by using NBSCs. How-
ever, using NBSCs does not cause these masqueraders
to be detected.
7 Discussion
Between 1998 and 2001, Schonlau and others [3, 4,
7, 11, 12, 13] have investigated a number of extraordi-
narily different techniques for detecting masqueraders.
As was the case with naive Bayes, the performance of
alternative detection strategies was mixed. Some mas-
queraders were detectable, and others were not. Some
users’ data generated many false alarms; others few.
Considerable effort has been expended to find a de-
tector that will detect masqueraders without failure.
Little effort has gone into determining how and why
the existing detectors fail, and whether anything could
be done to prevent those failures.
An alternative strategy – the one pursued here –
is to make progress by identifying and addressing the
problems with existing detectors. In the effort to im-
prove naive Bayes, the decision was made not to try
another detector, but instead to look more deeply at
naive Bayes, to determine precisely where improvement
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Figure 4. Effect of NBSCs on the anomaly
scores of all 120 masquerade blocks for
which the number of nonself users was
10. The commands used in the masquer-
ade blocks appear in the self training data
between 0 and 10 times, and appear in the
training data of each of the nonself users also
between 0 and 10 times.
was needed. That investigation focused on the role of
the super-masquerader in lowering the naive Bayes per-
formance, and from that focus came the discovery of
NBSCs. The work has confirmed that NBSCs have a
deleterious effect on naive Bayes performance. By iden-
tifying and specifically addressing this cause of failure,
efforts to improve naive Bayes are expected to be ef-
fective. This work investigated the hypothesized weak-
ness in naive Bayes with both mathematical analysis
and empirical measurements. Both have provided in-
sight into how naive Bayes profiles users, how it makes
decisions, and how the accuracy of those decisions can
be improved.
The results show that NBSCs do tend to lower the
anomaly score and cause the naive Bayes decision pro-
cedure to favor the self user, often erroneously. This
fact could be exploited by a masquerader to cause
naive Bayes to fail. However, this study has uncov-
ered precisely what allows a super-masquerader to suc-
ceed (NBSCs), providing an opportunity to address the
weakness. Here, the great diversity of detection strate-
gies can be used to the advantage of the defender. It is
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a clear extension of this work to select a detector which
complements NB in being able to detect NBSCs. NB
could be fortified with this second detector, providing
coverage precisely where naive Bayes is weak. This
fortification strategy will be explored in future work.
8 Summary and conclusion
A chronic failure of the naive Bayes masquerade de-
tector to detect masqueraders who use NBSCs has been
confirmed. It was hypothesized that NBSCs tend to
lower the anomaly score of a masquerade block, caus-
ing the NB decision procedure to favor the self user,
and miss the masquerader. The mathematical under-
pinnings of the naive Bayes algorithm were explored
and shown to provide theoretical justification for the
hypothesized effect of NBSCs. An empirical investi-
gation further measured and confirmed these effects,
carefully controlling for confounding factors with syn-
thetic data. The results show that NBSCs do tend
to lower the anomaly score and cause the NB decision
procedure to favor the self user. This fact could be
exploited by a masquerader to cause NB to fail. How-
ever, knowing the weakness provides the opportunity
to fortify NB against such failures. Future work will
address strategies for mitigating this shortcoming of
naive Bayes.
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